

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, TANAKA, Kiyoshi, live at Hokkaido, Kamikawa Aibetsumura, Aza Totosato 41. I certify that I have examined an article entitled, "SANGATSU, JUGATSU JIKENNO SHINSO," (True State of March and October Events) which was published in the March, 1946 issue of SEKAI BUNKA (World Culture), consisting of 15 pages of printed matter.

I further certify that the above described item is an extract from an article I wrote in 1933 while on leave of absence from the Japanese Army. The information contained in the article was obtained either from friends who were members of the SAKURA-KAI (Cherry Blossom Society) at the same time I was a member, personal knowledge and activities in the society, or in the course of official investigations which I conducted while assigned to the Investigation Division of the War Ministry. It is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

s/ K. TANAKA

WITNESS:

s/ Johnson E. Munroe
Investigator, IPS

Signed at Tokyo this 2nd day of October, 1947.

THE SO-CALLED "MARCH INCIDENT"

On the 9th of January General UGAKI made a decision to launch into the political world and organize a Cabinet.

On the 13th of January General UGAKI consulted about the ways and measures for reforming the nation, with SUGIYAMA the Vice War Minister NINOMIYA, the Assistant Chief of the General Staff, KOISO, the Director of the Army Affairs Bureau, HATEKAWA the Department Chief, YAMAWAKI, the Chief of Operations Section, (on that day, however, Lt. Colonel SUZUKI Shinichi acted as his proxy), Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO and Lt. Colonel NEMOTO (Positive Intelligence). At the beginning of January in 1931, Lt. Colonel NINOMIYA, the Assistant Chief of the General Staff showed Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO a note summarized as follows: "at this juncture when General UGAKI has come at last to launch into the political world, you are required to make a necessary plan for reform and present it."

Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, who trusted these words promptly accompanied Lt. Colonel SAKATA and myself into the branch room of the Investigation Division of the War Ministry and requested us to make a plan to begin activities at the suggestion of the Assistant Chief of the General Staff. Having considered it dangerous to believe these words at face value judging from the characters of General UGAKI and Lt. General NINOMIYA and the rumor about the "SAKURA-KAI" -- Cherry Society, Lt. Colonel SAKATA decided to confirm the real intention of the Assistant Chief again and to formulate two plans. (The one is a plan to reform the real state of things which serve the final purpose of the "SAKURA-KAI" and the other is to camouflage the "SAKURA-KAI" so that it need not be considered dangerous, or, in other words, to clearly specify that it is an extremely moderate organization, and the plan to be adopted shall be in accordance with the real intention of the Assistant Chief of Staff.)

Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO ascertained the real intention of the Assistant Chief in person, as a result of which he obtained the following information:

- 1) The military magnets who are agreeable to the appearance of General UGAKI are: Asst. Chief of the General Staff, Major General HATEKAWA, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, KOISO, Chief of the Military Service Section, HAGATA, Chief of the Appointments Section, TAMURA, Chief of the China Sections, SHIGEFUJI, Chief of the Second Section, Yamawaki. The attitude of the Vice-Minister of War is not clear.
- 2) Military forces may be used for the sake of the appearance of General UGAKI.
- 3) Military Units also have a full understanding.

- 4) As the programmes and policies of the future state to be established will be drawn up by senior officers, we are to devote ourselves to make plans as to how to seize the reins of government.

Thus we came to formulate the necessary plans regarding the foregoing. However, some senior officers stated that "the participants in this enterprise are to be restricted to officers under the rank of Captain because the livelihood of bereaved families could not be guaranteed in case of failure, as everyone would be sentenced as guilty and that therefore they should be limited to only those above the rank of Major."

This instruction greatly perturbed Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, Lt. Colonel SAKATA and others. Then, both of them asked the senior officers for their special consent to my participation, as they could not formulate a plan without me in regard to the past research work. As a result of the assistance of the Chief of the China Section, I was at any rate admitted to participate in the enterprise. But as is quite obvious, it is quite absurd to make a plan of construction and that of destruction separately. Instantly, it became impossible to practice the plan of holding the seized reins of power. Besides, it became evident that senior officers did not make any plan about the programmes and policies.

The circumstance having admitted of no delay, we decided to make plans for destruction and that for seizing the reins of government separately. The information obtained about the requirements necessary for deciding this programme at that time are as follows:

- 1) There was an extremely strong atmosphere among the Military head circles of venturing forth into the political arena.
- 2) The readiness for action of the Troops had been secretly completed.
- 3) The funds needed were to be appropriated from the secret funds without losing any time.
- 4) Dr. OKAWA, Shumei has decided to participate in it by calling for a volunteer force of about 10,000 persons mobilized from the proletarian classes (especially the mass populace party - TAISHUNO).
- 5) The time of action is to be the day when the Labor Law Bill is introduced before the House.
- 6) Liaison with the authorities is to be maintained by Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO.

Although we interrogated regarding details about the above-mentioned matters we received no satisfaction. (NOTE: Upon ascertaining matters later among the said information there were great doubts as regards 1 and 2; but 3 was in fact only partially paid; and 4 was a fact.)

In short the present action planned by the military circles is nothing but a pure "coup d'etat". We were made to formulate a plan in order to realize the "coup d'etat" using military forces on a very limited scale by expecting that the upper officers would earnestly devise some other constructive plans — but being pressed for time, everybody is taking action in his own way without any proper control due to the lack of planning materials; above all it is said that Colonel SHIGEFUJI has joined hands with Dr. OKAWA and ruthlessly connected himself with the Proletariate Party, and according to what I understand, had been planning a destructive plan.

On February 7th, shortly after 3 P.M., we met at the residence of Colonel SHIGEFUJI at Shinagawa. Those present were Lt. Colonel SAKATA, Lt. Colonel NEMOTO and myself.

Colone SHIGEFUJI said to me:- "As you are doubtlessly aware, those who are under the rank of Captain shall not be made to participate in the present Reform, but only you are an exception and even if the case should result unsuccessfully, you must not worry about the living of your bereaved family and you should take it easy as a certain plan is in a position to arrange matters satisfactorily, etc., etc."

After the discussion, SHIGEFUJI and others planned and decided upon a destructive plan, the outline of which is as follows:

- 1) A great speech meeting denouncing the Cabinet will be recently held at Hibiya conjointly by the three Proletariate Parties in order to exalt the spirit of overthrowing the Cabinet; and a demonstration towards the Parliament will be made as a reconnaissance preparation for actually carrying out the plan (although we have made minute plans regarding the matter, some are omitted here).
- 2) Seizure of the destroyed administrative power will be effected on the day when the Labor Law Bill is laid before the Diet. On that day, the Headquarters of both the SEIYO and MINSEI parties and the official residence of the Prime Minister are to be bombed. However, the bombs to be used shall emit loud explosive sounds but be of low casualty performance. The bombardiers are to mobilize 10,000 persons as per the plan of Dr. OKAWA, and the demonstration is to be carried on towards the Parliament from all and every direction; staff members with understanding shall be placed at the head of each column for maintaining discipline; bands with drawn swords shall be placed in each column in order to repulse naturally expected interference by policemen.
- 3) Troops shall encircle the Parliament by making an emergency call on the Pretext of protecting the Diet, who shall cut off all inner and outer communications, and the officers (principally members of the SAKURA-KAI /T.N. The Cherry Society/) shall be stationed beforehand on every road; and the staff members assigned to the various columns shall perform the said task.

- 4) At this point a certain Lt. General (whose name has been kept in secret to the last, and it is not clear even up to the present moment, but according to a rumor it is said to be Lt. General MASAMI) shall enter into the House accompanied by either Major General KOISO or TATEKAWA and several other officers, and declare to all Ministers that, "The nation does not confide in the Present Cabinet any more, but confides only in a Cabinet with General UGAKI as its Premier. As the country is now confronted by a grave situation you should meet the situation properly," and compel them to resign en bloc."
- 5) To compel acting Premier SHIDEHARA and others to tender their resignations.
- 6) In order to have General UGAKI receive an Imperial Mandate /T.M. to form a new Cabinet/ matters shall be maneuvered as per preparations made beforehand. (Envelope to be dispatched to H.I.H. Prince KAM-IM and Prince SAIONJI are decided.)

(1 to 7 represent merely the outline of the Plan, and although elaborate plans have been prepared for each item, same are omitted here as they are too intricate.)

At midnight of that day, the draft plan was completed. At the moment of dispersing, Colonel SHIGEFUJI attempted to distribute secret funds to us as campaign funds and automobile fees, (NOTE: These secret funds became a topic of discussion later on) but Lt. Colonel SAKATA and myself flatly refused to accept same as were opposed to the idea. This was due to the personality and clear foresight of Lt. Colonel SAKATA as well as to his proper training from normal times.

Colonel SHIGEFUJI and Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO were frantic with joy as if matters had already become accomplished. But I could not help from noticing some serious defects in the plans on viewing same as a whole; as for example, there was, above all, no link whatsoever with any constructive plan, apart from the absence of any fact to prove that the planned time was best suited; also the idea of trying to cooperate with persons outside of the military circles, especially with such a person as Dr. OKAWA.

On Feb. 8th, at 9 a.m. Colonel SHIGEFUJI and others of the previous day met together at the residence of Major General TATEKAWA, where we discussed the plans for seizing the destroyed political regime and decided to submit same to General UGAKI. (NOTE: Although Plans I and II were drafted, the fundamental principle of this plan was the same, the outline of which is as mentioned above.)

Everything was so arranged by now that we merely had to wait for the scheduled date.

However, the reports that came to me since then were all of an extremely dubious nature; for instance, that the attitude of the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, who was said to be most ardent as regards the execution of the plan, had become softened; that it seemed that Colonels NAGATA and OKAMURA have started to take an active opposition campaign; that the Vice-Minister of War showed in his attitude that he was becoming inclined to oppose same in general. Above all, the ambitions of the Asst. Chief of General Staff in regard to the Reform were extremely despicable (it being said that he was dreaming /of becoming the War Minister in the UGAKI Cabinet). Everyone acted in his own way as he pleased without any unity of action whatsoever, and failed to give even a single piece of information (under my active seeking for connections in all directions, I have ascertained the facts that the mobilization of 10,000 persons by Dr. OKAWA, to which grave significance has been given, was very doubtful; and that Dr. OKAWA and Colonel SHIGEFUJI, who had both indulged night after night in extravagant pleasure at ARAKI-Chu, Yotsuya, very imprudently let out such remarks in the presence of Geisha girls that their lives were at stake even till tomorrow. Above all what disappointed me most was that no study whatsoever had been made of the construction plan, platform of the principles, and the policies (NOTE: This point can be proven by judging matters whereby, according to the remarks of Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, Colonel YAMAWAKI of the General Staff, who had been very enthusiastic about the Reform at that time, asked me to lend him something that constituted a study of the platform and policies regarding the construction of a future society, and that the Colonel told me that, although the Chief of the Military Service Section appeared to have some plans, he was in reality greatly embarrassed).

Thus the contemplated Reform did not display a real reconstruction of a nation and a sincere spirit, but represented merely an act of recourse to violence whereby the debased attempts of seizing the reins of government by political parties were still further aggravated by being based upon the despicable ideals of trying to satisfy their own selfish and base ends by utilizing the Emperor's Army for their own private purpose. This applies also to General UGAKI as well as the Asst. Chief of the General Staff. We can not help resolutely opposing a Reform of this nature. We have become faced with the necessity of checking this reckless attempt. Fortunately, Colonels NAGATA and OKAMURA started a positive opposition movement. Lt. Colonel SUZUKI also is against it. Especially, Lt. Colonel SUZUKI kept a very close connection with Lt. Colonel SAKATA. Time elapsed very swiftly. At last the joint Speech Meeting against the Cabinet by the Three Proletarian Parties was held as per scheduled plan. However, we were indeed amazed at its small scale and low-spiritedness. When we had an interview with ASOH Hisashi, Leader of the TAISEI-TO Party and a leading figure of the then Proletarian Parties, he made it clear that the mass meeting of ten thousand people was nothing but a fantastic dream, as he had very little connection with Dr. OKAWA. We tried to persuade Colonel SHIGEFUJI and Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, who were extreme

radicals, as we decided that, from every point of view, it was the wisest policy to stop some by all means. However, elaborately we tried to explain the situation, they refused to listen to us and blindly pushed ahead with their plans. Finally, Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO delivered to the henchmen of Dr. OKAWA three hundred bombs (small ones as mentioned above). (NOTE: Repeated damage was done by these bombs.) At the result of this an inseparable and close relationship was formed between Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO and Dr. OKAWA.

However, blindly Colonel SHIGEMITSU and Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO pushed ahead, they could do nothing against the general trend of the times. It is said that General UGAKI finally summoned Dr. OKAWA and told him to put things off as the time was not opportune. Dr. OKAWA consented to this. Hereupon, the so-called "March Incident" came to an end without being carried out. However, on the other hand, this stimulated Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO and his radical associates and also made it clear that some of the high-ranking officers of the Control /T.N. Tokyo/ Headquarters had participated in the Reform. By force of circumstances, therefore, it gave us a strong conception that they were compelled to support the next reform, resulting in preparations being made for the so-called "October Incident".

Concerning the so-called "March Incident", the points worthy of attention are as follows:

- 1) Difference between a reform of the Rule of Righteousness /T.N. "CDO"/ and one of military government.
- 2) Thorough plans, especially Constructive Plan -- Constructive Plan and Destructive Plan.
- 3) Time of Reform.
- 4) Preparations from ordinary times as well as Establishment of the Guiding Spirit and Guiding Principle.
- 5) Control, unification and liaison.
- 6) Question of Liaison with persons outside of military circles.
- 7) Question of use of secret funds.

With the failure of the "March Incident", Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO devoted himself to enlarging and strengthening the SAKURA-KAI. By this, he made the actions of the SAKURA-KAI very active and acute, at a result of which the speech and action of the leading figures of the SAKURA-KAI became very violent. Simultaneously with this, bitter criticisms were made regarding the indulging in extravagant pleasures by certain persons among the leading figures of the Society, by saying that several leading figures of the SAKURA-KAI had been frequently indulging in extravagant pleasures under the pretext of studying matters and establishing the said Society's guidance policy.

Those who knew of it charged them of exploiting the SAKURA-KAI by misappropriating the secret funds of the March Incident for their own private use. On asking a certain leading figure of this criticism he said that this probably referred to the extravagant pleasures indulged in by Colonel SHIGEMORI and Dr. OKAWA concerning the March Incident. Which opinion is really true? At any rate, the internal discrepancies of the SAKURA-KAI thus became enlarged, and signs of an eventual split became evident. Therefore, we concluded that the effect of the various problems mentioned above would surely make the SAKURA-KAI fall into a dreadful abyss.

We made the following proposal at the regular meeting held in the middle of June in 1931 for the purpose of rescuing the SAKURA-KAI and make it enjoy a normal growth - namely, we checked the SAKURA-KAI from engaging in any pursuit rashly without a plan of logical construction and without grasping the mass psychology of the people; also so that the SAKURA-KAI should not be utilized as a tool for realizing anyone's personal ambitions, and protecting same from disintegration and dissolution, thereby making the SAKURA-KAI sufficiently able to execute its original plans at time of emergency.

In other words, the gist of the aforementioned proposal was:- "the leading figures of the SAKURA-KAI at least should understand the matters necessary for the reconstruction of a nation from psychology, social science, ethics, economics and political science and so on, with a view to formulating the guiding spirit of the SAKURA-KAI itself and the essential points of its actions. We should, first of all, invite the proper scholars and obtain our aim by means of friendly talks with them. On the other hand it is very good for us to have a body formed by such proper scholars that may come into use at some later date, by carefully judging their personality and knowledge (views)."

Fortunately, our proposal was accepted by the executives and it was immediately put into practice. We consulted Transport Corps Captain SUZUKI, a special student of the Imperial University, who had special connections with many professors. We achieved success through his negotiations with them. This undertaking was executed under the leadership of Professor YOSHIDA Seichi towards the latter part of June. However, the executives of the SAKURA-KAI suddenly abolished the undertaking on the ground that scholars generally do not arrive at any conclusion and decision and also lack the power of execution.

I traveled to the KANSAI District from the early part of July by availing myself of my vacation. A certain problem centered around the SAKURA-KAI cropped up during this trip - namely, the executives of the SAKURA-KAI, as a step towards the speedy acquisition of members and for the sake of a nationwide campaign, held a meeting, from both horizontal and vertical directions, of low-ranking officers after the 28th term in Tokyo and drafted out a manifesto which was sent out to all the low-ranking officers (after the 28th term) in Japan. The criticisms concerning this matter are varied. However, as far as only the SAKURA-KAI is concerned, it is adjudged that unexpectedly favorable results were obtained.

The executives of the Society were observed as being highly elated. This impression was of the time when I had an interview with Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO and the officers of the Russian Section of the General Staff after my return to Tokyo on the 4th of August. In this way, the so-called October Incident was to break out.

世界文化 昭和三十一年三月號

陸軍の秘史「三月」十月 事件の真相

田中少佐 手記

その抜萃

所謂三月事件

一月九日夜、宇垣大將は政界に乗り出し、内閣を組織する決心を固めたり。

一月十三日、宇垣大將は杉山次官、二宮次長、小磯軍務局長、建川部長、山脇(作戰)課長、軍事課長(但し當日は代理鈴木貞一中佐)、橋本中佐、根本中佐と共に國內改選の爲に此の三方手段を協議す。(確實な情報)

昭和六年一月初旬、参謀次長二宮中將は橋本中佐に對して左の要旨の如きことを示す。曰く

愈々宇垣大將は乗り出すに就き、変革のために必要なる計画を作成せしむべきこととす。

橋本中佐は「う言ひ信じ、直ぐに坂田中佐及吾を陸軍省調査班の支室に伴ひ、次長の言に従ひ愈々活動する」ための計画と作るべきことを承む。

然るに坂田中佐は、吾は宇垣大將、二宮中將の人物、櫻會に對する世評よりして處に此の一言と信するの不可にして危険なると思ひ、一應次長の本心を確かむべきと計畫は二案を作ること(一)案は直個の改革案にして、櫻會終局の目的より割り出すもの、他の一案はカムフラージュ的にして之により、櫻會は極めて温健

Doc/402-A

而も時日の急之に計し、雖も破壊計畫を遂行す
計畫を伴ふこととなり、當時此の計畫は木上は於て必要を認めて
知り得たる所なりと云ふ如し。

- 1 軍首脳部の案出ることより其勢甚だ鋭し
- 2 軍隊の出動準備は暗々裡と出来あり
- 3 必要な資金は税金費を以て取り敢て支出す
- 4 大川同朋博士に無産階級党と云ふ大衆黨の二萬人を動員、決
死隊を募集して参加する事に決定
- 5 決行の時機は労働法未上程の日とす

6 上司との連絡は橋本中佐とす（吾は以上の諸件細部に就て疑問せ
るも得る所なし、註、後日確かする所により、此の情報中1・2は疑
問の大なるものあり、3は實際的には一部支出、4は事實なり）

之を要するに、軍部今回の舉手は純然たる一つクダラーに過ぎ
ず、吾は極めて限られたる範圍に於て兵力行使クダラー實現の計畫
を伴ふこととなりたり。上級者は熱心に他の建設案を伴ふものと思
ひ下ら、而も時日は切迫し、立案の思料に乏しく、殊に何等の統制無
く、各自勝手なる行動を採りあり、殊に重藤大佐は大川博士と手を握
り、無軌道的に無産黨と連絡し、瓜分する所により、破壊計畫を遂
行せしめんと云ふ。

二月七日午後三時過、品川に在る重藤大佐宅に集合す、會する者坂
田中佐、根本中佐、及吾也。

重藤大佐は吾に云ふ「既に根本中佐より承諾せられ、今回の変
革に際しては、大尉級以下も参加せしめざることをなすも吾文
には特例とす。然し萬一不成功の場合に於ても、決して遺族の生活に

No. 3

Doc 1402-A

宇垣大將を首相とする内閣を信頼す。今や國家は重大の時機に會す。宜しく善處せらるべしと宣言し、總辭職を決定せしむ。

6. 藤原代理以下辭表を提出せしむ。

7. 大命は宇垣大將に降下する如く豫め準備せる所に從ひ策動す（閑院宮殿下及西園寺公の使者を決定す）

アークは計畫の大綱を、各々に就ては細部の計畫を立案せしむ繁雜に亘るを以て略す）

此の日夜半計畫案は成る。解散せんとする時、重藤大佐は各自に運動費、自動車代として機密費を分配せしむ（註、此の機密費につきては後日に問題となれり）坂田中佐と吾とは断乎として反対し遂に受けず、是れ坂田中佐の人となり先見の明、平時より指導の適切なりと歸す。

重藤大佐、橋本中佐は既に事成りしを如く狂喜せり。然し吾は其の計畫全般の見過しに於て重大なる缺陷あるを認めざるを得ず。軍部外の者、特に大川博士の如き人物と共同せんとせる點、時機として見る可き何ものも無き所、特に建設計畫との連繫が皆無なる等を是れ也。

二月八日午前九時、前日の重藤大佐以下建川少將宅に會し、破壊政權奪取計畫を討議し確定し、之を宇垣大將に呈することとせり（註、本計畫はオ一オ二の兩案を作為

No. 5

せりなるも 其の根本主義は同一にして前掲の如き大

綱を有し

令其決行の目を行つみたり

然るに其後を得る所、情報は甚に疑問多し

もみなり

部が曩きに決行に極めて熱心なりと稱せし軍部

局長態度、軟化せりと。永田閣内閣大佐は積極的

反訂を同姓と云く、陸軍次官は其態度大佐に於て反

訂に傾きたりと。殊に参謀次長、農林に打する心意は

極めて一種者なるものなり。(曰く半植内閣の下に於て陸相

を藹々たる女子と)各自は無統制にて擅に行動し、情

報する與(す)吾は悉く進んで連終を求め、中に重大なる意義

を興へるたる大川博士。一人動員は隨つて懐く、而かも

大川博士、重藤大佐は、四谷荒不町に於て連夜豪遊を

極め、不謹慎千方にも、明日を以て知らぬ命を云々と熟考、

前にて外するが如き等々報中甚を失望せしものより建設

計画主義綱領政策等に就きて、研究を皆無なりと過

計此、實に稱奉中佐の言、特に當時農林に熱心なり

と参謀本部、山崎大佐が、未來に會建設のたより、綱領

政策の研究せるものより、惜用してと吾に求のた

點並に同大佐の告ぐる「軍事課長も多少は空手かき

し、實は困り居る」との點等より、判斷し、実証せし

斯く企図する農林は、實個(國家)改造の純實なり

精神に於ては、非ずして俗吏たる政治家者流、政權を最

No. 6

Doc 1402-A

Doc 1402-A

No. 7

行動を一度失念し、陸下陸軍、赤い色で記された
を満ちんとする。早くも多くの感情を基礎として成れる背景の
行動たるのみ。宇垣大將然り参謀次長然りとす。

又此の如き性質の変革には断乎として反打
せざるを得ず。今や此の背景等を阻止する必要を見る。
幸に宇垣田岡村岡大佐の積極的反打運動あり。
鈴木中佐反打する。特に鈴木中佐は坂田中佐に極
め家接分る連撃を待たず。而かも時白の連に経過
し遂に豫定計画の如く無産三派連合の内閣改組演
説会を開かれり。然れども甚る規模の小気勢の不振
等は数々あり。又當時の無産中堅たり大衆黨
の首麻生久と全見せる時。大川博士と同に連絡極めて
薄く、一万人動員。如きは全く本望的夢想に過ぎざる
を明にせり。

最早千原の如く見えて断然中止するを賢明の筆な
り。意を沃し最急進分子たる重藤中佐橋本中佐
を説得せんとす。然れども如何に情勢を説述
ても耳を傾けず。却て益々小児病的となり盲進せんと
して驍ツ。遂に橋本中佐は爆弾を削削せしめて
三百個を大川博士の部下に交付せり（註此の爆弾
は屢々飛せり）此の結果橋本中佐と大川博士との間
には切ることある腐れ縁が結ばれるに至るなり。

重藤大佐橋本中佐が如何に盲進するにせよ大勢は
如何ともすすからず。宇垣大將は遂に大川博士を拒致

No. 8

Doc 1402-A

して「今回は時機適當なるを以て中止すべき」と
傳へたり」と云ふ。大川博士は之を讀み、茲に所謂三月事
件は未遂に終れりと雖、却て橋本中佐等の急進分
子を刺激し、且中央部の高級情威中、改革に加擔せる
者あるを明にし、行々懸り上、次回の改革には不同意な
る能はざる可との觀念を堅く抱かしめ、所謂十月事件を
準備せるの形となり。

所謂三月事件に關聯し、注意すべき件

1. 霸道の改革と王道の改革の差

2. 周到なる計畫、特に建設計畫——建設計畫と破
壞計畫

3. 改革の時機

4. 平素の準備、指導精神及指導原理の確立

5. 統制、統一連繫

6. 軍部外の者の連繫問題

7. 機密使用の問題

三月事件不成功に終るや、橋本砲兵中佐は鋭意櫻會
を擴大強化し、其の行動を活潑鋭化せしめ、同會幹部
の言動激越となり、之れと同時に同會幹部中の一部の
豪遊に對し激しく非難の起るあり、即ち櫻會幹部中の或
る若干の者は、之を研究、同會指導の策樹する等の爲め
稱し、屢々豪遊を繼續し、之を知る者は彼等が櫻會を好餌
とし、三月事件に當り機密費を私して、あり等々、難す。

Doc 1402-A

吾が某幹部級者には就き想したる結果、此の振舞は恐る
三月事件に關する重鎮大佐、大尉、大佐等の遊興を指すた
人々果して何れが真なるや。さういふ櫻會は新しく内部を
を擴大し、分派の光輝然たるものあり。

吾々前記せる諸問題の結果は櫻會として恐る可き期に
陥没せしむるをうんと判断し之が救済並に櫻會をより正當
の發達をせしむる爲め、時と理論を設計し大衆の心理
把握等無くして、櫻會を暴論せしむることを抑制し、櫻會
を以て自己野望を遂げしむるため、其に依するところを
しめ、其の分派解体を遂げしめ、以て兩軍の目撃會を本
金圖たる所を遂行する上に缺くる所世からしむるも、昭和
六年六月中旬の例會の席上、一の提言を爲せり。即ち櫻會
自他の指導精神及行動綱領を樹立するたため、幹部
部級は概して社會學、倫理學、經濟學、政治學等々の
中より國家改造のため諸問題を理解して之がため先づ
學者を招き、總體的に其の目的を達成すべく一面がく
ることに依り學者其の肩の人物意見も看取し、適者
者を以て一つの團體を結成し、後日の役に立てしむるを適者
とす。この要旨の論題はこれなり。

吾に云々提言は幹部の答へ所となり、直に之を実行
することせり。乃ち吾は之を吾大聴講室にも特殊關係
を多くの教授に有る鈴木龍彦大尉に計り交渉を行はし
め成功せり。此の舉は六月下旬、吾田靜政大尉を先頭とし、

No. 9

No. 11 402-A

證明書

余田中清、北海道三川愛別村字豊里五、
 居住ス。余、主頁、印刷物ヲ成ル世界文誌
 十九百零六年三月号所載ノ三月十月事件、直
 相ト題スル論文ヲ檢閲セリ、證明ス。
 余、更ニ二記記事、十九百三三年日本陸軍カ、
 賄賂、際、余、執筆セシ論文カ、摘翠ナリ。
 並ニ二記論文中ニ念シク知識、當時余モ一會三
 ノリニ標令、余莫ク及人等及同令ニ於ケル余
 ノ知識並ニ行動、或ハ又陸軍省調査課ニ調
 務セリ。余、行ニ公的調査中ニ得テシメ
 ナルコト。且余、知リ信ズル限リ真ニモ正ニキモ
 ナルコトヲ證明ス。

田中清ノ署名捺印

證人

JOHNSON F. MUNK

國際檢査部調査官

一九四七年十月二日 東京ニ於テ署名ス

No. 11

THE SO-CALLED OCTOBER INCIDENT

(Words were originally concealed
where underscored)

When I met Lieutenant Colonel HASHIMOTO on August 4, he said, "Around the middle of September this year, the KWANTUNG Army will carry out a plot which will create an opportunity to settle the Manchuria and Mongolia problem. The nation should internally seize this opportunity and carry out a fundamental reform, etc. The leading personnel of the General Staff have a thorough understanding of the domestic reorganization problem." (Note: The extent of this understanding is unknown. Is it a concrete understanding or does it indicate an item added to the estimate of the general situation?) The same Lt. Colonel added, "Therefore, in order for the political power to come to the military, or in other words, in order that the military as the nucleus can seize the political power, I want the draft of the plan prepared by around the beginning of September. The political programmes and policies will be studied and planned after seizing the power, etc." I promised to draft a plan of propaganda by attacking the corruption of the political parties and by arousing the indignation of the people, bring about a natural destruction of the parties. The Lt. Colonel agreed to this.

I again took a trip on August 10th, and reached Hokkaido.

During my absence, the Cherry Association /T.N. SAKURA-KAI/ held their regular August meeting at the KAIKOSHA. The Association carried out a complete turnabout in its policies at this meeting and resolved to become a cultural body with no connection whatsoever with the problems of the current situation.

This is an extremely grave problem. This change into a cultural body is nothing more than a mere outward appearance. It is nothing more than the plot by radical elements led by the Russian and Chinese groups who are planning a domestic reformation. (This incident later became clear through the direct story of a radical element.)

The Outbreak of the MANCHURIA-MONGOLIA Problem on September 18th.

On that morning I called on Lt. Colonel SAKAMOTO at the War Ministry and Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO at the General Staff Headquarters and learned the true circumstances of the Incident. At the same time it became clear that the reformation was not to be carried out when Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO said to me, "Since it has been decided that the domestic reformation should not be carried out at this time, I will return the propaganda plan to you for the time being, so I want you to give it further study." I believed Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO's words and thought that

the domestic reformation will not be carried out and instead that only the settlement of the Manchuria-Mongolia problem will be strived for.

However, on the night of October 3rd, I received a special delivery letter (sealed letter) from Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO. The letter stated: "I have something to discuss with you tomorrow the 4th, so please come to the MANKIN at Norigasaki. I shall be waiting there, etc." (Exactly as in the original text). (The postmark was KYOBASHI SHINTOMICHO). I went to the MANKIN at the prescribed location on October 4th with the premonition that something would happen, gathering from the meeting place and the mailing point. When I told the proprietor that I had come to call on Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, he asked my name, identification, etc., which he transmitted upstairs after which he finally ushered me inside. There present were Major CHO who was sent to China to be stationed there as an attache, Captain TANAKA, Ya, and Captain CHARA (Obara) of the Russian Section of the General Staff Headquarters.

They said: "The domestic reformation will now take place." "The War Ministry, General Staff Headquarters, and the 1st KONGYU Division are all preparing for the domestic reformation, and the Navy is also doing likewise."

"First the political power will be seized by the military through a 'coup d'etat', organize a dictatorship and carry out the domestic reformation."

"The Cherry Association /T.N. SAKU'A-KAI/ is in the midst of activities as the nucleus." (Note: These are statements made to everyone, especially to officers attached to units, in order to get them to join the movement.) With these words they demanded that I join them. They added: "Since the outbreak of the Manchuria-Mongolia Problem, we have been exerting efforts, day and night, in order to bring about changes, and have gone home only two or three times. We want you to join us and help the plan."

I was astonished at the unexpected turn of events. However, I had doubts, and my doubts are shown in the points of discussion between them and myself, a part of which is as follows: (The questions are by me, and the answers are by them.)

Q. "If the nucleus of the military is participating in the domestic reformation, there undoubtedly must exist principles, creeds and policies for the future social construction which they are planning. What are their contents?"

A. "They are secrets and cannot be revealed. We don't know their details either."

- Q. "What plan is it which you men have been working on days and nights since the outbreak of the Incident."
- A. "It is the plan of destruction."
- Q. "A plan of destruction should be made after completing the plan of construction and should be within the scope of the latter. That is, don't you think both plans should follow a consistent idea? Don't you think it unreasonable to form a plan of destruction without knowing what the plan of construction is?"
- A. The plan of construction is now being prepared by others."
- Q. "Then do you mean by others?"
- A. "The faction led by Dr. OKAWA, Shumei."
- Q. "Generally, what kind of destruction will be carried out?"
- A. "Intimidation by the naval bombing unit. The massacre of all the ministers at the Cabinet Conference held at the Premier's official residence. The seizing of the Metropolitan Police Board by attacking suddenly."
- Q. "Why do you consider these destructions necessary?"
- A. "It is necessary for the eradication of the ringleader."
- Q. "Is the internal reorganization possible through such destructions?"
- A. "The reformation is possible by destroying the political nucleus."
- Q. "For example, what will be done for the reformation in the economic field? Have you considered this?"
- A. Silence.
- Q. "As far as I know, Dr. OKAWA is not a constructive man. This was duly proven in the March Incident. In spite of this, has the Army leaders become so feeble as to entrust such a man with the most important construction plan?"
- A. "To tell you the truth, we haven't contacted the central leading figure of the Army yet, but we will get them to agree with us just prior to the action. That is why we are having Dr. OKAWA draw up the plan of construction."

Doc 1402-13 Cont. attached

「世界文化昭和二十一年三月号」

陸軍の秘史「三月十日事件」真相 田中少佐手記「その抜粋」
所謂十月事件

八月四日吾は橋本中佐に会ふ時、同中佐は言ふ「本年九月中旬、
東軍に於て陰謀を行ひ、滿蒙問題解決の機会を作ると、國內
は之を契機として根本的変革を敢行せんとするなり云々。而して國內
改造問題は参謀本部首脳部には十分諒解あり」と（註此の諒解
は何れの程度のものなるや不明なり、或は吳作的の諒解の情勢判
断中に加へたる事項を指示するや）

更に同中佐は言ふ此の世を以て軍部に政権の来るべき、
更言すれば軍部が中心となり、政権奪取のための計画案を九
月初旬迄に構成せられ、政綱政策は政権奪取後に於
て完成立案する云々」と吾は政黨の腐敗墮落を攻撃し、國
民大衆を憤起せしめ、自然的に政黨の崩解を招きせしむ
るための宣傳案を構成すべきを約す。中佐は之に同ず。

吾は八月十日再び旅行し北海道に至る。

吾は不在中、標会は八月の例会を偕行社に於て催す。此の
合に於て同会は百八十度の方角変換を行ふ。一、修養団体
となることを申し合はせ、一切時局問題に關係せざることを期す。

是れ甚だなる問題なり。一、修養団体には單なる表面
的紛飾に過ぎず、國內変革を企図せる無道合子なきを要す
とするに過ぎず（此の件は後日無道合子よりの直話により明かとなり）

九月十八日滿蒙問題突發

吾は此の朝陸軍省に坂田中佐を、参謀本部に橋本中佐を就
き、事件の真相を明らかにすると共に、橋本中佐より「今日は國內変革
を行はざることをせられたるにより、宣傳案は一応返却するに就き

no 1

No 2

2800 1402-13

更に研究し置かば度し」と申渡され、復讐を明にせり。

吾は橋本中佐の言を信し、國内復讐を行ふに急ぐ唯満蒙問題解決に邁進するなりと思ひ。

然るに十月二日夜(王曜旦)橋本中佐より、達達(封書)あり

文に「言ふ」明日(四日)打金有之候間、打金に請ふ下被。

下付入候なり(原文、儘)(消印は京橋已新富町)と吾は甚

の事合地と言ひ、發送地點と言ひ、其に何事かありと吾は

感へ、十月四日所示の地點に至る。

萬金に至り、橋本中佐を訪れたる言主人に傳へたるに吾

身命氏名要件を問ふ之を階上に傳へ、始め「吾は案内せり、

在室する者は最近支那駐在武官として赴任せる長少佐、

参謀本部勤務班、田中彌太郎大尉、小原大尉の三名あり。

彼等可は謂ふ

——今又國內復讐を行せし——

陸軍省参謀本部を彼の近衛、第一師団を以て國內

復讐に向て準備中。海軍亦知り。

た、——「チタ」——より、政権を軍部、独裁政を布き、

治復讐を行ふ。

櫻井会は中心となり活動中(註)是等、こは彼等が人を動

誘するたの到る處、特に隊所將校に對して格別なる所なり

等、件を以て吾に參考を要求せり。尚彼等は加へて云ふ滿

蒙事件、初發以來連日連夜復讐、爲る如き歸せし

と僅に二三回のみ参照して計画に助力せられ度しと

吾は事、吾は外なるに發せり、然れども吾は疑同然に能は

Doc / 402-13

答 吾等と彼等との議論の一部を掲ぐるにより、吾等の疑問とせし所を窺はん(問は吾。答は彼等)

問 国内変革に軍部、中樞が参加するとせば、恐らく其の企図する未來社会建設のための主義綱領政策は存在せん。如何なる内容のものなるや。

答 秘密に示し得ず。吾等亦之を精しく知る。

問 吾等事件を主として破壊計畫する所も、何の計畫なり。

答 破壊計畫なり。

問 破壊計畫は建設計畫と表裏し其の範囲内に於て作るべきも両者は一貫せる思想に従ふべきもの非ずや。

建設計畫を明かにせずして破壊計畫は不合理ならずや。

答 建設計畫は他に於て立案中。

問 也とは。

答 大川周明博士を主作せる所の一派。

問 大川に於て如何なる破壊を行ふや。

答 海軍の爆撃隊による威嚇。

首相官邸に於ける閣議の席上に於て大佐金部を刺殺。警視廳の急襲奪取。

問 何の爲や。是等の破壊を必要とするや。

答 元兇の掃蕩のため必要なり。

問 此の如き破壊により國內改造は可能なりや。

答 政治の中樞を破壊するにより変革は出来得。

問 例は經濟方面の変革は如何にするや。又之を考慮するや。

答 (黙す)

Doc / 402-13

No 4

同。吾。知。れ。る。範。圍。に。於。て。は。大。川。博。士。は。建。設。者。に。非。ず。ニ。ハ
事。件。に。於。て。該。範。疇。に。属。す。る。程。陸。軍。中。央。部。は。消。耗。せ。る。也。
答。実。は。未。だ。軍。中。樞。部。首。腦。者。に。は。連。絡。不。し。も。共。行。
直。前。に。於。て。は。同。意。せ。し。可。く。之。を。爲。す。に。大。川。博。士。を。以。て。建
設。者。と。す。る。に。あ。り。な。り。

Doc / 402-13

證 明 書

余、田中清、北海通上川愛利村字豊里田ニ居住。
余、十五頁、印刷物ニ、瓜ル世界文化千五百四十六年
三月号所載、三月十日事件、真相ト題スル論文ヲ
檢閲スルニ、證明ス

余、更ニ上記記事、十九百三十二年日本陸軍方ヲ
賜假、際余、執筆セシ論文ヲ、夜、基ナレト、並ニ
上記論文ヲニ含シタ瑣識、當時余、一會員タリ、
櫻會、會員タル友人等、又同會ニ於ケル余、知
識並ニ行動或ハ又陸軍省調査課ニ勤務セシ
同余、行ニ公的調査中ニ得タリシモノ、且
余、知リ信スル限り、真ニニテ正ニテ、ト此ニ
證明ス。

ケイウナカ田中清署名捺印

證人

ジョージ・エム・ロウ / JOHNSON F. MUNROE
國際檢察部 調査課

一九四七年十月二日 東京ニ於テ署名ス

1405